THEOPHRASTUS' *DE ELIGENDIS MAGISTRATIBUS*: VAT. GR. 2306, FRAGMENT B

JOHN J. KEANEY and ANDREW SZEGEDY-MASZAK

Princeton University and *Wesleyan University*

The two oldest folia (*bis rescripta*) of Vat. Gr. 2306 (now a text of Strabo) contain longish fragments (A, B) of a work which dealt with political and legal antiquities of several Greek states. Although both fragments come from the same work, the contents of the folia are different, A treating judicial procedure, B the criteria for selection to office. The folia were never part of a single larger folium, and the disparity in their contents suggests that they were not originally contiguous.

The *editio princeps* of the fragments with their attribution to Theophrastus was by Wolfgang Aly, who had been assisted in the tasks of decipherment and interpretation by Wilhelm Croenert. The only other edition is by Francesco Sbordone: this remains especially valuable for its linguistic commentary.

Fragment B, which we treat here, has three columns on each side with 44 lines to a column. Although the fragment is incomplete at beginning and end, and illegible in many places, much of the content and progression of thought is clear. Thus, as was not the case with fragment A, the consensus of the interpreters of B is correct: it concerns the selection of magistrates, and the title which Aly gave to both fragments—*de eligendis magistratibus*—is at least correct for B. Aly and Sbordone put their emphasis on clarifying the text. We propose a somewhat wider treatment and attempt to view the text within the contexts of Aristotelian theory, fourth-century biography and contemporary political institutions.[1]

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[1] For details of the manuscript see J. J. Keaney, "Theophrastus on Greek judicial Procedure," *TAPA* 104 (1974) 179–94. Frequent reference is made to Aly (*Fragmentum Vaticanum de eligendis magistratibus = Studi e Testi* 104), Sbordone (*PP* 3 [1948] 269–90)

The Structure of Fragment B

Except at lines 240 ff., where an important transitional passage is almost illegible, clear structural divisions are discernible. The structural key is that the contents of individual parts alternate between collective criteria for office and single criteria applied to single offices.

Part I (lines 1–36) begins with the topic of *empeiria* in the *stratēgia*, and there follows a historical digression on the propriety of *ousia* as a criterion. This leads to the posing of a general question (II: lines 36–42) on the proper criteria for office, in the order

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{A} & \dot{a}\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta} \ \kappa a\dot{\iota} \ \pi\lambda o\hat{v}\tau o\varsigma \\
\text{B} & \dot{a}\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta} \\
\text{C} & \pi\lambda o\hat{v}\tau o\varsigma
\end{array}
$$

In part III (42–59), each of these criteria is applied to a specific office, in chiastic order

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{C}^1 & o\dot{v}\sigma\dot{\iota}a \ \tau a\mu\iota\epsilon\dot{\iota}a \\
\text{B}^1 & \delta\iota\kappa a\iota o\sigma\dot{v}\nu\eta \ \nu o\mu o\phi v\lambda a\kappa\dot{\iota}a \\
\text{A}^1 & \dot{a}\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta} \ \kappa a\dot{\iota} \ \chi o\rho\eta\gamma\dot{\iota}a \ \sigma\tau\rho a\tau\eta\gamma\dot{\iota}a
\end{array}
$$

Empeiria is added to A^1, and the addition (because of the relationship between *empeiria* and *phronēsis*) effects the transition to IV (59–88): this is a repetition and amplification of parts II and III:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{(II)} & \dot{a}\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta} \\
& \kappa\tau\hat{\eta}\sigma\iota\varsigma \ \dot{a}\rho\kappa o\hat{v}\sigma a \\
& \phi\rho\dot{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma
\end{array}
$$

(III) application of these criteria variously to offices in general, with the importance of *phronēsis* stressed.

Part V (88–105) mentions other desirable qualities:

$$
\begin{array}{l}
\pi\dot{\iota}\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma \ (\text{cf. } 14) \\
\phi\rho\dot{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \ \kappa a\dot{\iota} \ \delta\epsilon\iota\nu\dot{o}\tau\eta\varsigma \\
\dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\mu\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota a \ \kappa a\dot{\iota} \ \dot{\iota}\tau a\mu\dot{o}\tau\eta\varsigma
\end{array}
$$

None of the offices to which these qualities are relevant is specified (as they are in the parallel section, VI), nor are there institutional means (as there are in VI) by which these qualities may be acquired. We suggest that the more personal, innate character of these qualities is

stressed, and that this is why the author emphasizes that the burden of selecting the most suitable candidates is put on the selectors themselves (101–105).

Because of its length (105–221), part VI is doubtless the most important segment of the fragment. It makes explicit the distinction (already implied at 70–71) between lower (ἐλάττονες) and higher (μείζονες, μέγισται) offices. The relationship between the two forms the substructure of the argument, which is that holders of higher office must have experience, whether this be gained by a man holding lower office first or by the association of younger with older men in the higher office.

The rest of B (221–64) is too fragmentary to allow more than guesses about the nature of its contents.[2]

The Aristotelian Background

The truth of Cicero's statement (de fin. 1.6), Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos?, is perhaps best illustrated in the relationship between B and a passage in the fifth book of the Politics. As part of his discussion on how oligarchies and democracies are to be preserved, Aristotle recommends (1309A27–32) that certain perquisites be granted to the "opposition" in each type of government (the rich in democracy, the poor in oligarchy), but that these perquisites should not include the ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας. He continues (1309A33) τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, τρίτον δ᾽ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς). ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν,[3] ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ ταῦτα πάντα περὶ τὸν αὐτόν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν.[4] The aporia may be summarized as follows. In the case

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[2] It may be pointed out that any restoration which involves more than sixteen letters a line (as several of Aly's do) should be ruled out: the average length of a line is twelve to fourteen letters.

[3] Newman ad 1309A39 points out that aporiai are rare in Book 5. In fact, they are found only in this chapter.

[4] Mutatis mutandis, the same qualities are desirable in a public speaker: cf. Rhet. 2.1378A8 (phronêsis, aretê, eunoia).

of a *stratêgos*, on what basis is the choice to be made if candidate A has the second quality but lacks the first and third, while candidate B has the first and third but (by implication) lacks the second? Aristotle's solution is that the person who possesses the rare quality is to be chosen. Thus, in a *stratêgos*, *empeiria* is to be ranked above *aretê*: ἔλαττον γὰρ στρατηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δ' ἐπιεικείας πλεῖον. The opposite is true ἐν δὲ φυλάκῃ[5] καὶ ταμιείᾳ (πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἢ ὅσον οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πᾶσιν).

This leads to a further *aporia*. If the first and second qualities co-exist, what need is there of the third, since the first two will effect τὰ συμφέροντα? The passage then shifts directions and goes on to topics which have nothing to do with the original *aporia*.

The differences between the two passages reflect their contexts. Aristotle mentions δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν because he is talking about two specific forms of πολιτεῖαι, oligarchy and democracy: he fails to discuss wealth as a criterion for office because wealth is a defining standard of oligarchy. Theophrastus betrays no interest here in constitutional distinctions.

More pronounced are the similarities. Both discussions take the form of an *aporia* (in Theophrastus, σκέψις, 38); both emphasize high office; both focus on high office in terms of the *stratêgia* and *tamieia*; and both discuss roughly the same criteria for selection to office. It appears that Theophrastus took up anew a problem raised in an abstract and hypothetical way by Aristotle and gave the problem wider expression, especially by rooting it in historical contexts.

Fol. B^r, col. I

    καὶ ἄπειρον εἶ-
    ναι στρατηγόν·
    ἡ γὰρ βλάβη καὶ
    οὕτως μεγάλη
5   πλὴν οὐκ ἀπὸ κα-
    κίας. ἀλλὰ δῆλον,
    ὡς ἀμφοῖν δεῖ
    στοχάζεσθαι· κρά-
    τιστον δ' εἴ τις
10 ἐκ τῶν βίων καὶ

Fol. B^v, col. I

133 πόλεων [κα]θάπερ
    Καρυστίων καὶ Κυ-
135 θνίων· τρεῖς μὲν
    γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐστρα-
    τηγηκότων ἤδη,
    δύο δ' ἐκ τῶν νε-
    ωτέρων καθι-
140 στᾶσι. μάλιστα
    οὖν ἐν ταύτῃ δεῖ
    μεγίστους ἀνή-

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[5] In the sense of financial guardianship.

τῆς ἀγωγῆς, ἀλλὰ
μὴ ἐκ τῆς οὐσί-
ας λαμβάνοι τὴν
πίστιν, ὅπερ ἡ
15 παιδ⟨ε⟩ία καὶ τὰ ἔ-
θη τὰ χρηστὰ τῆς
πολιτείας ἀπο-
τελεῖ. δοκεῖ γοῦν
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀρ-
20 χαικώτερος ὁ
τῶν τιμημάτων
νόμος εἶναι δ[ι]-
ὰ τὸ κωλύειν ἂν
πολλάκ(ε)ις τοὺς
25 ἀληθ(ε)ινοὺς ἡ-
γεμόνας. οὔτε
γὰρ Ἐπαμ⟨ε⟩ινώνδας
οὔτε Πελοπίδας
οὔτε Ἀθήνηθεν
30 Ἰφικράτης καὶ Χα-
βρίας ἐστρατήγη-
σαν ⟨ἂν⟩ οὔθ᾽ οἱ τού-
των ἔτι πρότε-
ρον καὶ ἀμείνους,
35 Ἀριστ⟨ε⟩ίδης καὶ Θε-
μιστοκλῆς. φαί-
νεται δ᾽ οὖν καθό-
λου τινὰ σκέψιν
ἔχειν, τίνας δεῖ
40 κατὰ πλοῦτον καὶ
40a ἀρετὴν [ἢ κατ᾽
ἀρετὴν] μόνον
ἢ πλοῦτον. ἐν
μὲν γὰρ τῇ ταμι-
είᾳ, καθάπερ εἴ-
col. II
45 ρηται, τὰς οὐσίας
τηροῦσιν· εἰς δὲ
νομοφυλακίαν
ἤ τινα τοιαύτην
ἑτέραν δικαιο-
50 σύνης δεῖ, πρὸς

κειν καιρούς, οὐ
μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν
145 ἄλλη τοιαύτη συγ-
καταμ⟨ε⟩ίκτος ᾖ, ὁ-
μοίως ταῖς ἡλι-
κίαις λεγομέναις
ἅμα κόσμον καὶ
150 ἅμα ταῖς ἀκμαῖς
δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν,
οἷον ἐν τῇ γυ-
μνασιαρχ(ε)ίᾳ· τοῦ-
το γὰρ οὐ κακῶς
155 οἱ αἱρούμενοι δύο
τὸν μὲν πρεσβυ-
τέρον τὸν δὲ νε-
ώτερον, ὅπως
ὁ μὲν εὐταξίαν
160 παρέχῃ μεταδι-
δούς, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς
συναποδυόμε-
νος ἡγεμὼν γ(ε)ί-
νηται τῶν πό-
165 νων. οὐ γὰρ δίκαι-
ον ἄμφω ταῦτα
τὴν αὐτὴν λατ[ρ]εί-
αν ἔχειν· ἀμφο-
τέρων δὲ ἡ ἐπ(ε)ι-
170 μέλεια. δεῖται δὲ
αἰσθηδ(έ[εω]ς χρη-
στῆς· ἀλλὰ δεῖ πρό-
τερον ἄλλας προ-
άρξαι τὸν μέλ-
175 λοντα τὰς μεί-
ζους ἄρξειν, ὅπερ
col. II
κα[ὶ] ἐπὶ τῆς στρα-
τηγ(ε)ίας ἐλέχθη.
ἄτοπόν γ᾽ εἰ ὁ μή
180 ταξιαρχήσας μη-
δὲ φυλαρχήσας
εὐθὺς εἶτα ἐστρα-
τήγησε. ταῖς με[ν],

δὲ στρατηγίαν
καὶ τῶν ἔξω καὶ
τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
κυρία[ν] πρὸς τῇ ἀ-
55 ρετῇ καὶ χορηγί-
αν ἔχειν ἱκανήν,
ἐπὶ δὲ τρίτον, ὡς
εἴρηται, τὴν ἐμ-
πειρίαν. καὶ ἔστι
60 τρ[ί]α ταῦτα περὶ τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἀρετή, κτῆ-
σις ἀρκοῦσα, φρό-
νησις—τὸ γὰρ τῆς
εὐνοίας κοινόν—
65 ὧν τὰ μὲν δύο
[δ]εῖ πάσαις, τὰ δὲ
τῆς φρονήσε-
ως ἰδιώτερον ἐν
ἐνίαις, ἀναγκαιό-
70 τατον δ' ἐν ταῖς με-
γίσταις· καὶ ἀρκε[ῖ]
γέ πως, εἰ ἀδόλως
εἰς ἄμφω βλέ-
πουσι· ἀγαθὰ
75 γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ
τ' ἐπιδεῖν καὶ ἄρι-
στ[α] δή καιροὺς
γνῷ[ν]αι παρ' ἄλλο
ὥσθ' α[ἱρ]εῖσθαι [διὰ]
80 τὴν εὐμοιρίαν
καὶ τὴν δύναμιν.
ἔνιοι δὲ πρὸς θά-
τερα, ἀστοὺς ἀρί-
στους γὰρ κρίνου-
85 σιν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι
καὶ χείριστα βου-
λευόμενοι πρὸς
τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀλη-
col. III
θὲς δέ, ὅπερ ἐλέ-
90 χθη πρότερον,
ὡς αἱ μὲν δέον-

ὡς ἔ[δ]οξε, ἀναπε[ι]-
185 ρᾶσθαι χρὴ πρότε-
ρον, ταῖς δ' ὕσ[τ]α-
τα δυοῖν ἕνεκα·
[τ]αύ[τ]η γ[ὰρ] τῇ δ[ι]α[θέ]-
σει τὸν προσδοκή-
190 σαντα [ἐ]πίτονον τ' ἀ-
παρ[τί]ζε[ι] καὶ φιλο-
τιμότερον πα[ρ]α-
σκε[υ]αζε[ι] πρὸ[ς] [πεῖ]-
ραν διὰ τ[ὰ]ς [θ]έσεις
195 τῶν μειζόνων ἢ,
ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐν Ἠ-
πείρῳ, διὰ τὴν μο-
νήν. τοῦτον δὲ
ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττό-
200 νων ἀρχῶν ἢ τῶν
ἐπὶ τὰς μείζους
ἀφορισθεισῶν
κ[αὶ ἐν] νό[μ]ῳ ἐνια-
[χ]οῦ δ[εῖ ἀν]ελ[έ]σθα[ι]
205 κα<θά>περ ἐν Φω-
κεῦσιν· τοὺς γὰρ
στρατηγοὺς κα-
θιστᾶσιν ἐκ [τῶ]ν
πεφυλαρ[χ]ηκότων
210 κα[ὶ] τεταμιευκό-
τωῂ. χρὴ δ' ὅλως
οὐδένα ἄναρχον
[ἄ]ρχειν ἕως τὸν
ἀβούλευτον, ὧς-
215 περ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ.
χορηγ<ε>ῖ γὰρ ἑλ[έσθαι]
τὸν ἐμπειρ[ία]ν
λαμβάνοντα τῶν
κεκοινωμένων
220 ἀεὶ καὶ μετὰ νεω-
col. III
τέρων. εἰ δὲ δή
ποτ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ π[ο]-
[λιτ]εία, δεῖ οὖν ε
ἀεὶ ἄνδρα πολλο[ῦ]

ται μάλιστα πίστε-
ως, αἱ δὲ φρονή-
σεως καὶ δεινό-
95   τητος, αἱ δὲ ἐπι-
μελ<ε>ίας καὶ ἰταμό-
τητος, ἂν ἔχθισ-
τον ᾖ, οἷον πρὸς ἕ-
καστα νόμῳ μὲν
100   οὐ ῥᾴδιον κατα-
νέμειν· αὐτοὺς
δὲ δοκιμάζον-
τας αἱρεῖσθαι χρὴ
τοὺς ἐπιτηδ<ε>ιο-
105   τάτους, ἐπεὶ δὲ
ἔνιαι, καθάπερ
ἐλέχθη, καὶ ἐμπει-
ρίας δέονται, πρὸς
ταύτας ὀρθῶς ἔ-
110   χει τὸ παραζευ-
γνύναι τινὰς ἀεὶ
τῶν νεωτέρων,
ὅπως παιδεύων-
ται παρὰ τῶν εἰδό-
115   των μηδὲν χεῖ-
ρον διοικουμέ-
νων τῶν τῆς
πόλεως, ὅπερ
καὶ Ἅγνων ποτὲ
120   συνεβούλευεν
Ἀθηναίοις ἐπ(ε)ὶ
τῶν στρατηγῶν
παραδείγματι χρη-
σάμενος τῷ πε-
125   ρὶ τὰ κυνηγέσια·
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ σκύ-
λακας ἔφη παρεμ-
βαλεῖν ἀεὶ τοὺς
φιλοκυνήγους.
130   χρῶνται δὲ καὶ νῦν
ἔνιοι τῶν ὁμοτά-
κτων ἐλαττόνων

225   [ἀ]πα[ξα]πᾶσιν <ἄξιον> ἀνα-
[τεὶ] προσάρχειν
τὰς μεγίστας ἀρ-
χάς, οἷον καὶ ἐν
[τ᾽ Ἄ]ργχει, κἂν μὴ
230   πρότερον, καὶ ἐν
Καρχηδόνι βασι-
λεῦσαι καὶ στρα-
τηγῆσαι· ἐκ τού-
των γὰρ ἡ γερον-
235   τία παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἦ[ν].
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως αὐ-
τοὶ μὲν οὐχ ἧτ-
τον ἅμα τῇ ἀρχῇ
[τι]μὴν ἔχουσιν
240   τὰ [νῦν]. ἔτι δὲ ἐν ἱ-
[εροῖς] σιτήσον-
ται. τοῦτο πειρα-
τέον ἀνατρέπειν.
δο[κεῖ] δὲ ἔχειν ὁ
245   [εἰρημ]ένος τιμήν,
ας..τλε..ι σε μισ[εῖν]
τὰ [γ᾽] ἄ[λλα καὶ] τὸ ἀνέγ-
[κλητο]ν εἰς τὰ κοι-
νὰ διατηρεῖν, ὡς
250   λόγον ἀποδιδόν-
τες τριακονταε-
τεῖς δεχθήσονται,
ἐφ᾽ ἃ διατ<ε>ίνωσι ἄν.
οὐ γὰρ ἔξεστι τὸν
255   ἐπαιτιώμενον
ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως
ἀρχ(ε)ικῶς οὐθὲν
δυνάμενον οὔ-
τ᾽ ἐξετάζειν οὔτε
260   κολάζειν καὶ κα-
ταπλήττεσθαι
τοὺς ἄλλους τὸν
ἑαυτῷ τι συνει-
δότα φλαῦρον

40–40a καὶ [ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ’] Oliver;   50 sic interpunxit D. M. Lewis;
54 κυρία[ν] D. M. Lewis, κυρία cod.;   78 ἄλλο[ν] Aly;   98 ἔχθιστος
Aly;   128 παρεμβάλλειν?   131 τῶν [ν]όμῳ Sbordone;   145 ἄλλη
τοιαύτη Aly;   166 ταῦτα Croenert;   ταῦτα⟨ς⟩ sc. τὰς ἀρχὰς Aly;
167 ἀσχολίαν Croenert;   171 διαθέσεως voluit Croenert;   246–7
ἀσ[κῶν] τὰ ἐ[π]ιθέμιστα [κ]α[ὶ διὰ] τὸ ἀνεγ- Sbordone

B^r: Translation

. . . and the general is inexperienced; in this case the damage is also great but it does not stem from cowardice.   But it is clear that people should aim at both; it is best if one gains trust from his life and up-bringing and not from his wealth—education and good customs of the State accomplish this.   At any rate, it seems in general that the law based on census-classes is rather old-fashioned, since it would have frequently blocked genuine leaders.   For neither Epaminondas nor Pelopidas nor, from Athens, Iphikrates and Khabrias would have been generals, nor would those still earlier than these and better, Aristeides and Themistokles.

In general, it seems to be worth investigating which offices should be qualified by wealth and virtue or by virtue alone or by wealth. For in filling the office of treasurer, as has been said, they look at wealth; for the guardianship of the laws or another similar office, there is a need for justice; for the generalship, whether it control external matters or matters within the State, the candidate should have adequate financial resources in addition to virtue, and thirdly, as was said, experience.   And these are the three criteria for office: virtue, sufficient wealth and practical wisdom (loyalty is predicated of all offices).   Of these, the first two are necessary for all offices, while practical wisdom, especially appropriate for some offices, is essential for the highest ones.   And in a way it is sufficient if they honestly look at both qualifications, for these are generally good at perceiving things and are best at recognizing critical moments (as opposed to other qualifications): as a result, they choose candidates for their good fortune and ability.   Some look at one of the two qualifications, for they select the best citizens, but most people and those who deliberate worst look at wealth.

It is true, as was said before, that some offices especially require

trustworthiness, some practical wisdom and cleverness, some diligence and sheer boldness—distasteful as this may be—what sort of a person to assign by law to each duty is difficult. It is necessary that those who scrutinize candidates choose the most suitable.

Since some offices, as was said, also require experience, it is a good idea always to attach some of the younger men so that they may be trained by those who have knowledge, without detriment to the administration of the State. This is what Hagnon once advised the Athenians in the case of generals, using as an example what happens in hunting. For there, he said, lovers of the chase always put in pups. Some of the well-governed smaller states now use [this practice], like Karystos and Kythnos. For they appoint three from those who have already served as general and two from the younger men. In this office, especially, the most critical situations necessarily arise; moreover, if another similar office be a mixture [i.e., of young and old], in the same way, with the ages as described, there must at once be good order and efficiency tied to physical primes, as in the gymnasiarchy. In this instance, they do not err who select two men, one older, one younger, so that the former may provide discipline by his participation, the latter, himself stripping down with the rest, may be the leader of the physical exercises. It is not right that both should have the same physical work, but the supervision should be shared. Good . . . is required.

A man who is going to hold higher offices should first hold lower ones, as was said in the case of the generalship. It is strange if a person who has not served as taxiarch or phylarch then immediately became general. Some offices, as it seemed, should be attempted earlier, others last for two reasons. With this arrangement, it makes the person who expects [to hold office] intensely eager and more ambitious for the attempt because of the placing of the higher offices or, as used to be the case in Epirus, because of the delay. In some places, as in Phokis, it is necessary legally to select this man from the lower offices or from the offices marked off as leading to the higher. [In Phokis] they appoint generals from former phylarchs and treasurers. In general, no one should hold [higher] office, without having served at least as *bouleutês*, as in Ambrakia. For it is always useful to elect someone who has had experience of public affairs along with the younger men.

If ever the State depends upon him, it is necessary always for a man . . . to hold the highest offices, as in Argos (although it was not legal before) and in Carthage to hold the offices of king and general, for the senate at Carthage consisted of these officials. But perhaps they have no less honor now along with their office. They still . . . The attempt should be made to overthrow this . . . (254) to whatever offices they aim at. For it is not right for a person under indictment by the State with no official power to investigate nor to punish and frighten others, a person conscious of his own fault.

Commentary

7. ἀμφοῖν: the reference is to ἐμπειρία and (inferred from κακία, 5) ἀρετή (Sbordone 276) or ἀνδρεία.

14. πίστιν: Aristotle, Pol. 6.1322A32–34, says that it is especially those offices concerned with the safety of the city and with war which ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς. For the distinction of duties into τὰ ἔξω and τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει, cf. 51–53 below.

18–28. The disparagement of wealth over against other criteria is consonant with Theophrastus' dictum (schol. Plato, Laws 6.631C) that οἱ κακοί as well as οἱ ἀγαθοί can have πλοῦτος.

27–36. With this collection of names,[6] we move into a theme of fictionalized biography: the man who achieves (military and) political success in spite of his poverty. The theme perhaps began with Aeschines' of Sphettus treatment of Aristeides,[7] but has little historical

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[6] They are found together elsewhere. Poverty; Aristeides, Phocion, Epameinondas, Pelopidas, Lamakhos, Socrates, Ephialtes (Aelian, VH 2.43): continence; Aristeides, Phokion, Phormion, Epameinondas (Athen. 10.419a); Aristeides, Epameinondas (Front., Strat. 4.3.5–6).

[7] Cf. Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen 1.160 note 5 and H. Dittmar, Aeschines von Sphettos = Philologische Untersuchungen 21 (Berlin 1912) 206–7. The tradition of Aristeides' poverty was at least assisted if it did not originate in the story that Socrates had two wives, one Myrto the granddaughter of Aristeides, whom ἀναλαβόντι χηρεύουσαν διὰ πενίαν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεομένην (Plut., Vit. Arist. 27.2): cf. J. W. Fitton, "That was no lady, that was . . .," CQ n.s. 20 (1970) 56–66, L. Woodbury, "Socrates and the daughter of Aristides," Phoenix 27 (1973) 7–25 and P. Bicknell, "Sokrates' Mistress Xanthippe," Apeiron 8 (1974) 1–5. For the Aristeides-legend in general, cf. I. Calabi Limentani, "Aristide il Giusto. Fortuna di un Nome," Rend. Ist. Lomb. Cl. di Lett. 94 (1960) 42–67. It is interesting to note that Theophrastus was apparently unaware of or chose to ignore the attempt of Demetrios of Phaleron (fr. 95 Wehrli) to refute, by using historical data, this aspect of the biographical tradition.

support.   Epameinondas' poverty was συνηθὴς καὶ πάτρια[8] and Iphi-
crates was of humble origins,[9] although he was later described as
πολλὰ κτήματα κεκτημένος.[10] Pelopidas was wealthy,[11] and Themis-
tokles,[12] Aristeides and Khabrias were of more than comfortable
circumstances.[13]

42–46. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 8.1 (with 47.1), used a law of Solon to
the effect that treasurers were κληρωτοὶ ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων to
prove that Solon has introduced sortition into the election process at
Athens.

55. χορηγία in the metaphorical sense of "adequate material wealth"
is a coinage of Aristotle: cf. *Nic. Eth.* 10.1178A24 and, for the verb,
Pol. 7.1323B41.

58–59, 66–68. For the connection between *empeiria* and *phronêsis* see
P. Aubenque, *La Prudence chez Aristote* (Paris 1963) 58–59. He
defines *empeiria* as "ce savoir vécu plus qu'appris, profond parce que
non déduit, que nous reconnaissons à ceux dont nous disons qu'ils
'ont de l'expérience.'"

64. εὐνοίας: Aristotle had used φιλία, for which Theophrastus sub-
stituted the more technical term; cf. *SIG* 4, pp. 363–364.

68. ἰδιώτερον: for the phrase, cf. *Pol.* 3.1277B25–6: ἡ δὲ φρόνησις
ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη.

73–74: cf. *Pol.* 2.1273A29–30: αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα (sc.
ἀρετή and πλοῦτος) βλέποντες; 4.1293B14–15: ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἰς
τε πλοῦτον κτλ.

77. καιρούς: cf. 143 below and Theophrastus' work, Πολιτικὰ πρὸς
τοὺς καιρούς (Diog. Laert. 5.45).

93–95. On the connection between *phronêsis* and *deinotês*, cf. *Nic.
Eth.* 6.1144A27–28: διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν
εἶναι and the remarks of Aubenque 61–62.

[8] Plut., *Vit. Pel.* 3.2.
[9] Plut., *Mor.* 186 f; Ar., *Rhet.* 1.1367B18. Cf. J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied
Families 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford 1971) 248–52.
[10] Dem. 21.62.
[11] *Vit. Pel.* 3.1: τραφεὶς δὲ ἐν οὐσίᾳ μεγάλῃ καὶ παραλαβὼν ἔτι νέος λαμπρὸν οἶκον.
Plutarch adds (3.2–3) that Pelopidas shared the poverty of Epameinondas.
[12] The relative lack of wealth attributed to Themistokles may have its origin in the
story (not believed by Plutarch, *Vit. Them.* 2.6) that he had been disinherited by his
father: again the story can be traced to Aeschines Socraticus (*P. Oxy.* 13.1608, fr. 4).
[13] Cf. Davies 211–20, 560–61, 48–53.

95–96. For Plato, *Polit.* 311A8, ἰταμότης, qualified (τις) and tempered with moderation, is one of the essential qualities of the statesman.

110–11. παραζευγνύναι: for the meaning "cooperative activity" see *P. Ryl.* 237, line 4. In Plato, *Laws* 6.760BC, the *agronomoi* coopt younger men for service.

118–29. In the last quarter of the fifth century, there were complaints about (comparatively) young men in high political positions.[14] The phrase points to public discussion, and Oliver 118 suggested that Hagnon's remark was made with specific reference to Alcibiades. On the eve of the Sicilian expedition, Nicias also made a pointed reference to Alcibiades' youth.[15]

147–49. For related language, cf. *Pol.* 7.1331A35–38: εἴη δ' ἂν εὔχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γὰρ διηρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον.

150. For Aristotle the physical ἀκμή occurred between the ages of 30 and 35: *Rhet.* 2.1390B8–10.

156–70. For a plurality of gymnasiarchs, cf. J. Oehler, *RE* 7.1969–2004. The situation envisaged here is probably best paralleled in those *poleis* which had a γυμνασίαρχος alongside a ὑπογυμνασίαρχος (Oehler 1976). A division of duties and responsibility is sometimes implied, as in *IG* IV 753.7–8 (Troezen, *saec.* IV *ante*), in which both officials are honored, the first for his [σπουδὰν ὅπως] τὰ εἰ[ς] τὸ γυμνάσιον εὔτακτ[α ποιῇ. Cf. also *IG* XII⁷ 235.25 (Amorgos), where the hypogymnasiarch is responsible for the inscription of a stele carrying a decree in honor of the gymnasiarch.

166. ταῦτα: Sbordone 278 translates: "non sarebbe giusto infatti che queste due mansioni richiedessero lo stesso tirocinio." He does not, however, cite any parallels for λατρεία = tirocinio. Aly's suggestion ταῦτα[ς] sc. τὰς ἀρχάς is attractive, if a distinction is intended along the line of gymnasiarch/hypogymnasiarch.

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[14] Cf. Eupolis *Demoi*, fr. 100 Kock:

καὶ μήκετ', ὦναξ Μιλτιάδη καὶ Περίκλεες,
ἐάσατ' ἄρχειν μειράκια βινούμενα,
ἐν τοῖν σφυροῖν ἕλκοντα τὴν στρατηγίαν,

and W. R. Connor, *The new Politicians of fifth-century Athens* (Princeton 1971) 147–49.

[15] Thuc. 6.12.2: νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν; cf. 5.43.2: ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ἔτι τότε ὢν νέος.

169–70. For ἐπιμέλεια used of cooperative responsibility in education, cf. *Pol.* 8.1337A29–30: ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἑκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν.

180. According to F. Gschnitzer, *RE* Supplb. 11.1087, the office of phylarch at Athens "nicht selten die erste ehrgeizig erstrebte Stufe einer Laufbahn die—ohne strenge Regeln natürlich—im allgemein über die Hipparchie zur Strategie emporführt."

226. προσάρχειν is not found elsewhere in the active voice: perhaps "to hold one office in addition to another."

229–30. An alternative intepretation: "even if he has not held office before."

231–33. We assume that Theophrastus refers to the tenure of the kingship and the *stratēgia* by one man.[16]   This practice was irregular[17] and is not attested after the fourth century.

The information that one senate at Carthage was composed of former holders of these offices is new and may help to clarify a confused situation.[18]   Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.1272B34–73A15) mentions three collegiate bodies at Carthage, a *gerousia*, a board of one hundred and four, and pentarchies: no other source mentions the last two, at least by those names.   For the third century, Polybius (10.18.1) distinguishes between a larger (σύγκλητος) and a smaller (γερουσία) body.   The question is with which of these bodies Aristotle's body is to be identified.   Gsell opted for the larger body, with the argument that Aristotle would scarcely have omitted so important a council in his discussion of the Carthaginian constitution.   This identification can be squared with the present passage only if we assume that Aristotle's *gerousia* and Theophrastus' *gerontia* are different groups.   Some support for this is Livy's description of the smaller group (which at the time was composed of at least thirty members) as *principes seniorum* (30.16.3).

The obvious alternative to this reconstruction is that no identification is possible because of changes in the political system at Carthage after the fourth century.

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[16] Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.1273B8–9: φαῦλον δ᾽ ἂν δόξειεν καὶ τὸ πλείους ἀρχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν, ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.   Aristotle does not specify the offices involved.

[17] Instances are listed in S. Gsell, *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris 1918) 2.199 note 7.

[18] The best treatment is still that of Gsell 2.202–26.

241. In approving Aly's restoration, Oliver 118 remarked. "This, it seems to me, is a definite allusion to the secret nocturnal meetings (συσσίτια) of the Carthaginian Council in the Temple of Eshmun, whence was exerted a tyrranical control over the entire state." The συσσίτια, however, probably "comprised the whole citizen-body,"[19] and nocturnal meetings of the Senate at the temple may not have occurred on a regular basis: only Livy refers to them and only twice (41.22.2; 42.24.3).

[19] Newman *ad Pol.* 2.1272B33.